



General Conference

GC(54)/OR.1

December 2010

General Distr

English

Fifty-fourth regular session

Plenary

Record of the First Meeting

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Monday, 20 September 2010, at 10.10 a.m.

Temporary President: Ms MACMILLAN (New Zealand)

President: Mr ENKHSAIKHAN (Mongolia)

Iran 86-100

86. Mr SALEHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the General Conference provided an opportunity to assess the global community's efforts in achieving the peaceful objectives of an organization that had been established primarily for humanity's well-being and prosperity. It was an important gathering of Member States of various beliefs and backgrounds reflecting the international community's collective will to share thoughts, exchange opinions and experiences, and attempt to find the best possible solutions to outstanding issues. In turn, the Agency should provide all the necessary elements and an environment conducive to the realization of that noble objective. His country, in accordance with its legal commitments, had always tried to extend its utmost cooperation to the Agency and had undertaken sincere efforts to perform its peaceful nuclear activities within the framework of the NPT and comprehensive safeguards.

87. Pursuant to its comprehensive safeguards agreement, all Iran's nuclear installations were subject to the Agency's routine monitoring and inspection. Since 2003 more than 5000 man-days of inspections had been conducted, which was unprecedented in the Agency's history. The result of such huge efforts had always led to the conclusion that there had been no diversion to non-peaceful activities. Unfortunately, however, the Agency appeared to have ignored all the conclusive evidence and the cooperation extended by Iran. Certain parts of the Director General's latest report on the issue did not coincide with the norms and procedures of the Agency's mandate and were not based on impartiality and fairness, raising queries as to the political influence exerted by certain powers upon the decision-making of what was a unique international technical body. For the sake of credibility, the verification process envisaged in the safeguards agreement had to be implemented without any biased political interest or double standards. It appeared that the Agency was suffering from a crisis of moral authority and credibility.

88. The notion of political interference had regrettably left its mark in the field of technical cooperation as well. That area should clearly not be subjected to any political conditions, as stipulated in the Statute and the Revised Guiding Principles and General Operating Rules to Govern the Provision of Technical Assistance by the Agency (INFCIRC/267). Yet, owing to pressure exerted by a few countries, certain unjustifiable constraints had been imposed by the Secretariat on Iran's participation in programmes in the

nuclear safety domain. Nuclear safety was of global importance, and any negligence in rendering services in that field might lead to hazardous nuclear events of international dimensions. The inexcusable restrictions imposed on Iran ran counter to the Agency's claim to be enforcing global nuclear safety standards and a global nuclear security culture. How could Iran enhance safety standards at its nuclear installations while the active participation of its experts in related international conferences, workshops and meetings organized by the Agency was being hampered? Undoubtedly, such an unjustified and unreasonable attitude and conduct would lead to undesired consequences regarding the establishment of mutual confidence among Member States.

89. Another issue was the provision of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor, which met the radiopharmaceutical needs of thousands of patients. Despite repeated efforts by Iran for mutual confidence building, no encouraging result had thus far been achieved. The Joint Declaration by Iran, Brazil and Turkey concluded on 17 May 2010 had been a positive gesture by Iran to resolve the fuel swap issue and sustain the ongoing dialogue. That had also been subject to unjust political pressure by a few countries that possessed nuclear weapons, resulting in the issue of the unjustified and illegal Security Council resolution 1929. The uncivilized double-track approach of threat and dialogue could not be fruitful, as demonstrated by the fact that there was no assurance of nuclear fuel supply. He therefore called upon the Vienna Group to resume talks with his country without further delay, based on the internationally acknowledged Tehran Declaration of 2003.

90. Forty years on from the inception of the NPT the world was still witnessing an imbalance between disarmament and non-proliferation; and the international community continued to suffer as a result of that imbalance. Although there had recently been seemingly positive progress in the field of disarmament, essential practical steps had to be taken urgently towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the achievement of disarmament goals. The achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons was one of Iran's main priorities and would require all three pillars of the NPT to be pursued in an unbiased and balanced manner. The importance of that subject had led to the holding in 2010 of the Tehran International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, based on the principle of 'nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapons for none'. The 2010 NPT Review Conference had also shed more light on the matter, making it more prominent than ever. At the Tehran International Conference, all participants — who came from 60 countries — had expressed their deep concern over the stockpiling, deployment and expansion of WMD, particularly nuclear weapons. They had also reiterated the need to implement comprehensive disarmament as a priority, through the establishment of a mandatory convention for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

91. For many years Iran had been emphasizing the need for the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East region in line with the unanimous resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and with the 2010 NPT Review Conference, as well as relevant UN General Assembly resolutions. For the first time a consensus had been reached on demanding that the Zionist regime of Israel promptly become a party to the NPT. The 2010 NPT Review Conference had stressed the need for Israel to place all its nuclear installations under the Agency's comprehensive safeguards; however, due to the support given by its Western allies, no action had yet been taken in that regard. Iran invited all peace-loving countries to intensify their efforts to exert more pressure on the Israeli regime to submit unconditionally to that international demand. It was time to move away from political games and redirect collective efforts towards a balanced treatment of countries seeking peaceful nuclear technology, while putting intense pressure on countries which had defied international demands.

92. With regard to assurance of nuclear fuel supply, under the NPT, all Member States had the inalienable right to research, production, development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. That right

included deploying national capabilities for manufacturing fuel for research and power reactors. Member States also had the right to choose how to obtain nuclear fuel, whether domestically or through foreign trade, without any constraints. The 2010 NPT Review Conference had reaffirmed the right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy without discrimination and without jeopardizing their access to the complete nuclear fuel cycle subject to Agency supervision.

93. It was of the utmost importance to differentiate between the safeguards commitments of Member States and confidence building measures taken on a voluntary basis. As the sole international verification body, the Agency was responsible for assuring the adherence of Member States to their safeguards agreements but should at no time declare the voluntary measures of Member States to be mandatory. Moreover, any verification by the Agency had to be performed without discrimination or double standards.

94. The issue of confidentiality was one of the issues that had caused Iran deep concern with regard to the Agency's performance. Member States should not find their national security endangered and under no circumstances should their classified information be disclosed. The matter required close scrutiny, particularly with respect to recent developments at the Agency.

95. As an active member of the Agency, Iran had been able to make huge advances in nuclear technology through its diligent national efforts. It was ready to share its valuable nuclear experience with other Member States under the supervision of the Agency. In light of the recent interest shown by Iran's neighbours in having nuclear power plants, his country suggested the formation of a regional technical group for the exchange of know-how and expertise, specifically in the area of nuclear safety.

96. In order to realize its national interests, Iran had incorporated the use of peaceful nuclear technology into its development plans; and by deploying state-of-the-art engineering techniques and standards had ably enhanced its domestic capability in that respect. The production of radioisotopes for medical, industrial and agricultural use, as well as the design and construction of various installations for the provision of nuclear fuel and the treatment of nuclear waste, were among the main objectives of Iran's development plans. In that respect, he was pleased to announce that the Bushehr nuclear power plant, with a capacity of 1000 MW, would soon be producing electricity and that the IRRS mission to Iran in March 2010 had confirmed the activities of his country's nuclear safety system for deploying the relevant standards at the plant. That confirmation by the Agency's safety regulation monitoring body, as well as by a group comprising the highest-ranking safety authorities of some Member States, was another clear indication of Iran's commitment to international nuclear safety regulations.

97. The protection of nuclear installations from armed attack was essential for the promotion of nuclear energy in the world. The 53rd session of the General Conference had unanimously adopted a decision prohibiting any attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations under construction or in operation (GC(53)/DEC/13). The 2010 NPT Review Conference had called upon all States Parties to abide by that commitment.

98. Iran's parliament had decreed the construction of nuclear power plants totalling around 20 000 MW over the next 20 years, and he invited all potential suppliers to seize the opportunity to participate in the construction of those new plants.

99. Iran, while strongly defending its national rights, would continue to maintain its constructive efforts through sustained interaction and dialogue with its counterparts. While safeguarding its

national interests, Iran would continue its sincere cooperation with the Agency, in the hope that the power of rationality would overwhelm the logic of power.

100. He thanked the Agency's staff for their hard work and expressed the hope that their assiduous efforts, impartiality and objectivity would be instrumental in upholding the Agency's valuable mission.