



General Conference

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Record of the First Meeting Fifty-sixth regular session

Held at Headquarters, Vienna, on Monday, 17 September 2012, at 10.15 a.m.

Temporary President: Mr FERUTA (Romania)

President: Mr BARROS OREIRO (Uruguay)

Iran 150-164

150. Mr ABBASI DAVANI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that, in keeping with Islamic principles, his country had always opposed and would continue to denounce the manufacture and use of weapons of mass destruction. Iran's Supreme Leader had stressed that the production and use of nuclear weapons were forbidden. Iran did not believe that nuclear weapons could serve as a basis for might and power. The victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the toppling of the US-backed monarchy had shown that a nation could overcome the power of nuclear weapons through reliance on its own natural and human resources and capabilities.

151. Following the assassination of Daryoosh Rezaeenejad, Dr Majid Shahriyari and Dr Masoud Alimohammadi, Zionist agents had murdered Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan and his colleague Reza Qashqaei with a car bomb. Other specialists and persons negotiating with the Agency had also been targeted by terrorists who had been identified and arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards. The advent of nuclear terrorism and the indifferent response to it by the Agency's Secretariat might well mean that specialists from other countries were also at risk. Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan had played a key role in Iran's nuclear and enrichment technology activities.

152. In 2011, the Director General had been invited to visit Iran's nuclear activities and facilities and requested to propose a reasonable verification timeframe. A year had passed but no response had been forthcoming and, regrettably, the Agency continued to take the approach that such negotiations failed to produce results. The Agency should be more patient about what it called verification and act more cautiously in order to respect the rights and security of Member States.

153. Given the proximity of Iran to certain countries, the risk of the Taliban, Al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein's regime to his country's national security had been much greater than for other countries, especially those on the other side of the Atlantic. It was imperative for Agency

inspections to be carried out with due consideration for the specific conditions of the region and the need to build confidence.

154. Perhaps the Agency Secretariat had departed from its principle of impartiality and justice as a result of mismanagement and the influence of certain States. If Iran were to take the same cynical and unjustified approach as certain Agency authorities, it would discontinue dialogue and turn to other options. Terrorists and saboteurs might have slipped into the Agency and might be covertly influencing the decision-making process.

155. It was worth citing a few examples to illustrate Iran's concerns. On 17 August 2012, the electric power lines between the city of Qom and the Fordow complex had been cut using explosives. A power cut could damage centrifuge machines. In the early hours of the next morning, an Agency inspector had requested permission to conduct an unannounced inspection. One had to wonder whether there was any connection between that visit and the explosion. Who, other than Agency inspectors, could gain access to the complex in such a short time to record and report failures? A similar attack had been carried out against the power lines to the Natanz facilities.

156. Iran had sought to procure the items it needed for its activities in a legitimate manner on the global market, though the sanctions imposed on it did not help. It truthfully reported to the Agency all statistics about the number of centrifuge machines, the exact amount of enriched uranium, and the enrichment of the uranium in UF₆ flowing out of the machines. That information had been made readily accessible to saboteurs and terrorists in Agency reports. On 20 May 2012, that matter had been brought to the attention of the Director General, who had been shown a device with explosives inside and had been requested not to pass on such information. Unfortunately, the Director General's latest report had contained even more precise details. Thankfully, Iranian experts were now able to anticipate unwanted events and ward off cyber attacks, industrial sabotage and bombings. They had also devised ways of ensuring that nuclear facilities remained intact in the face of missile attacks and air raids.

157. The 50% increase in the number of centrifuge machines enriching up to 5%, the start-up of four cascades of centrifuge machines to increase production of 20% enriched uranium in Fordow, and the start-up a cascade of new-generation centrifuge machines had all been necessary to meet needs and to deal with possible damage.

158. The greatest outcome of all the advances Iran had made in the field of nuclear science and technology had been the generation of self-esteem and national confidence, making the country a model for others in the region and the whole world and showing that a country could resist pressure, preserve its independence and break the scientific monopoly of certain arrogant powers. Fuel production for the Tehran research reactor was an example of that. Iran's capability in the areas of uranium exploration, extraction, processing and enrichment up to 20%, conversion to U₃₀₈ with an enrichment of 20% and use thereof in the production and assembly of fuel plates demonstrated the determination and capability of Iran's experts and their dedication to peaceful cooperation aimed at promoting human health and welfare.

159. As in the past, Iran remained committed to meeting its obligations vis-à-vis the Agency and under the NPT and it would continue to assert its rights. The Agency should change its approach with regard to Iran. It should seek Iran's assistance to dismiss the accusations levelled against the country by certain hostile States; it should not act in a manner that suggested that its mission was to prove allegations.

160. Iran, as a Member State of the Agency and a country that would always use its nuclear capability for peaceful purposes and for the good of humanity, sought the Agency's assistance in strengthening the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and achieving universal nuclear disarmament, which must start with the State that had pioneered the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons and always needed an imaginary enemy for its own survival.

161. The Agency should help Member States improve the application of nuclear technology, and Member States should enjoy their rights while respecting their obligations. All Member States had the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Selective and conflicting approaches violated that right. As the Chair of the NAM, the Islamic Republic of Iran would defend the rights of all NAM members, and it sought to improve the unfair structure of the Agency's Board of Governors. A more democratic Board of Governors would strengthen the Agency. A State which had used nuclear weapons should not be allowed to be on the Board of Governors.

162. The Zionist regime had nuclear weapons and was a serious threat to international peace and security. Liberating Palestine from the Zionist occupiers did not require the production and use of illegal nuclear weapons. The solution was democracy and recourse to the opinion of the native residents of Palestine.

163. The aim of those who opposed Iran's nuclear progress was to maintain a monopoly of power and wealth and strengthen colonization and modern slavery. The sanctions against his country needed to be seen in that context.

164. With its technology, Iran was ready to assist all nations in their quest for freedom and independence.